A serious methodological challenge which researchers face is the identification of (systemic) banking crises. Most studies identify a (systemic) banking crisis based on exceptional events or policy interventions, such as bank closures, deposit freezes and government rescues (cf. Laeven and Valencia 2008 , 2010 , 2013 and Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). However, Von Hagen and Ho (2007) argue that this events methodology may be biased for several reasons. First, such interventions may refer to a few banks having problems rather than the whole banking sector.
Second, it is hard to determine whether a particular policy intervention is taken because of a systemic banking crisis. Third, policy interventions mostly occur when a crisis has a significant impact on the financial system or the economy, which implies that the start of the banking crisis may be identified too late. Finally, not each crisis leads to government interventions as central banks sometimes solve financial problems successfully. Therefore, there may be a selection bias when banking crises are identified based on interventions by government authorities. 1 Drawing on the reasoning of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996a, 1996b) , Von Hagen and Ho (2007) propose an index to identify banking crises based on money market pressure (which will be discussed in more detail in section 2.2). A monetary pressure index (MPI) cannot offset all drawbacks of the events methodology, but advantages of a money market pressure index include that it is less subjective, available at a higher frequency (several countries are not included in the most widely used crises databases) and timelier (as it relies on less information).
Although the Von Hagen-Ho index is very innovative, we argue that it can be improved upon by using nominal instead of real interest rates and by weighting its components differently.
The objective of this chapter is to construct a modified monetary pressure index (MPI) to identify banking crises. We construct our MPI for a larger sample of countries than Von Hagen and Ho (2007) . For comparison purposes we use the Laeven-Valencia (2010) database of banking crises, which is based on the events methodology.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews previous research on identifying banking crises. Section 2.3 discusses the index proposed by Von Hagen and Ho (2007) and presents our proposed amendments. Section 2.4 describes the data and criteria for identifying banking crises. Section 2.5 compares crises identified by both indexes with crises according to databases based on the events methodology, and offers a sensitivity analysis. Section 2.6 discusses the tradeoff between missed crises and false alarms and section 2.7 concludes.
Identifying banking crises 2.2.1 The events method
The events method identifies banking crises based on the occurrence of certain events, such as bank runs, closures, mergers and government interventions. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) adopt information from supervisors and country experts to identify banking crises. In its World Economic Outlook, the IMF (1998, p.76) Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2002, 2005) identify an event as a crisis if at least one of the following conditions holds:
1. the ratio of non-performing assets to the banking system's total assets exceeds 10%;
2. the cost of the government's rescue operation is at least 2% of GDP;
3. banking sector problems result in a large-scale nationalization of banks; 4. extensive bank runs take place or emergency measures such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees are enacted by the government in response to the crisis. Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2010) adopt a somewhat different definition to identify banking crises. Laeven and Valencia (2008, p. 5 ) define a systemic banking crisis as an event where a "country's corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. This situation may be accompanied by depressed asset prices (such as equity and real estate prices) on the heels of run-ups before the crisis, sharp increases in real interest rates, and a slowdown or reversal in capital flows. In some cases, the crisis is triggered by depositor runs on banks, though in most cases it is a general realization that systemically important financial institutions are in distress."
As pointed out in the Introduction of this chapter, Von Hagen and Ho (2007) argue that the events method has several shortcomings. Therefore, they suggest an index based on pressure in the money market to identify banking crises.
Money market pressure index
The basic idea of the money market pressure index of Von Hagen and Ho (2007) is that in a crisis the banking sector will face difficulties, such as an increase in nonperforming assets, withdrawals of deposits, and drying up of inter-bank lending, which will lead to a sharp increase in banks' demand for central bank liquidity.
The central bank will react to this increased demand in two ways. If central bank reserves are the operating target of monetary policy, the supply of reserves will be constant and the short-term interest rate will rise. Otherwise, the central bank will sustain the level of the short-term interest rate and inject additional reserves into the banking sector. Thus, a banking crisis is generally characterized by a sharp increase of short-term interest rates, the stock of central bank reserves, or both.
Based on this logic, Von Hagen and Ho (2007) propose the following MPI:
where ∆ is the difference operator, γ is the ratio of central bank reserves to total bank deposits, r is the short-term real interest rate, while σ ∆γ and σ ∆r are the standard deviations of ∆γ and ∆r, respectively.
In identifying a banking crisis, Von Hagen and Ho (2007) apply two criteria.
First, the index needs to exceed the 98.5 percentile of the sample distribution for the country under consideration. Second, the increase of the MPI from the previous period should at least be 5%. The first condition ensures that only exceptional events are treated as crises, and the second one is applied to avoid signaling crises in countries that did not experience a banking crisis. 2 Von Hagen and Ho quantify these criteria by selecting the combination of parameters that can best identify crises as listed by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) .
Modification of the money market pressure index
The money market pressure index constructed by Von Hagen and Ho (2007) is less subjective than the events methods. However, the index has some drawbacks as well.
First, due to data limitations Von Hagen and Ho calculate standard deviations over the whole sample period thereby ignoring possible changes in monetary regimes.
As we have sufficiently long samples-each country's sample exceeds 9 years-we apply rolling 24-month periods to calculate standard deviations. 3
Second, the index of Von Hagen and Ho (2007) is driven by the most stable component. If the ratio of central bank reserves to total bank deposits γ is constant for a long time (which is the case in some countries), the standard deviation of ∆γ is equal to zero and the MPI cannot be constructed. 4 Even if σ ∆γ does not equal zero, it will generally be much smaller than the standard deviation of the short-term interest rate σ ∆r , so that the ratio of central bank reserves to total bank deposits γ receives more weight than the short-term interest rate r. Sticking to the logic of the von Hagen-Ho index, i.e. keeping the combination of interest rates and reserves, but 2 These two criteria are similar to the extreme-value based identification of currency crises studied by Lestano and Jacobs (2007) . In Section 2.6 we will come back to this rule. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we follow Von Hagen and Ho's (2007) criteria. 3 To examine the sensitivity of our findings, we have experimented with different lengths of the moving window to calculate the standard deviations. The fact that the standard deviations are measured over overlapping periods could lead to high autocorrelation. However, as will be explained in the next chapter, the correlation between the current and lagged values of the MMPI are fairly low. 4 In this case we use the value 1e-6 as a proxy.
changing the weights, we propose the Modified Monetary Pressure Index (MMPI):
. This modified MPI does not suffer from the problems outlined above. The weights of the new index fall in the interval (0, 1] and add up to one. To illustrate the difference between the two indices, we provide an intuitive example. We set the value of σ(∆γ) to 1, while the value of σ(∆r) varies from 1 to 100. Figure 2 .1 shows the resulting values of the weights of MPI and MMPI. We find that the value of ω 1 is smaller than 1 σ(∆γ) and ω 2 is almost the same as 1 σ (∆r) . In our sample (as discussed in the next section), the ratios of σ(∆r) to σ(∆γ) are in a range of [1, 50] , so the weight of ∆γ in constructing MMPI is smaller than in constructing MPI indicating that our index is less driven by the most stable component.
Figure 2.1. MPI and MMPI for different weights for two components
Notes: This figure shows the differences between weights in Equation (2.1) and (2.2). Sigma() and sigma(r) are the weights in Equation (2.1), and ω 1 and ω 2 are the weights in Equation (2.2). In this figure, we set the value of sigma() to 1 while the value of sigma(r) varies from 1 to 100.
Third, Von Hagen and Ho use the short-term real interest rate in their index to capture money market pressure. As pointed out by Cecchetti and Disyatat (2010), three types of liquidity shortages can be distinguished, namely shortages of central bank liquidity, market liquidity, and funding liquidity. Central bank liquidity refers to deposits of financial institutions at the central bank, which are held by financial institutions to meet reserve requirements, if any, and to achieve final settlement of all financial transactions in the payments system. Market liquidity refers to the ability to buy and sell assets in reasonably large quantities without significantly affecting price. Finally, funding liquidity describes the ability of an individual or institution to raise cash, or its equivalent, again in reasonably large quantities, either via asset sales or by borrowing. As pointed out by Cecchetti and Disyatat (2010), all these different types of liquidity shortages are reflected in nominal short-term market rates.
Using the short-term real interest as a proxy for liquidity shortages implies that also inflation has an impact. If the nominal interest rate is constant but the real interest rate decreases due to higher inflation, the money market pressure index will go down thereby wrongly indicating that money market pressure has increased. But the reverse is also possible. So constructing MPIs using real interest rate may lead to very distorted outcomes. In fact, previous research suggests that, if anything, inflation has a positive impact on banking crises (cf. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998, 2002) and not a negative impact as implied by the index of Von Hagen and Ho. Below we analyze the choice of using nominal vs. real interest rates in more detail for some countries. Indexes that are based on real (nominal) interest rates have an R (N) in front of the index.
We deviate from the analysis of Von Hagen and Ho (2007) in two more ways.
First, the sample of Von Hagen and Ho includes mostly countries which suffered from at least one banking crisis, while they include only few countries without banking crises. Therefore, there may be a sample selection bias and it is not clear whether the index is reliable in countries which did not experience banking crises. To avoid this bias, we include more countries with and without banking crises to investigate whether the index can identify banking crises in both types of countries.
Second, although Von Hagen and Ho (2007) consider 'missed crises' (i.e. the index does not signal a banking crisis when there is one according to database used for comparison purposes) and 'false alarms' (i.e. the index signals a banking crisis when there is no crisis according to the database used for comparison purposes), they do not consider the tradeoff between 'missed crises' and 'false alarms'. In this chapter, we apply a quantitative method to assess this tradeoff (see section 2.6).
Sample and criteria for identifying banking crises 2.4.1 Sample
We use monthly data from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, spanning the period 1975M1 to 2009M12, to construct money market pressure indices. European countries that have joined the euro area are not included after the start of the currency union as country-specific data are not available. As a money market pressure index can only be constructed in a meaningful way if interest rates are marketdetermined, we exclude countries with a repressed financial system. 5 To determine to what extent the financial system of countries is repressed, we use information from the Fraser Institute, i.e. the sub-index of "Interest rate controls/negative real interest rates". 6 This index ranges between zero and ten. The highest score (10) is given when interest rates are determined primarily by market forces, as evidenced by reasonable spreads between deposit and lending rates. A zero rating is assigned when the deposit and lending rates are fixed by the government and real rates are persistently negative by double-digit amounts or hyperinflation virtually eliminates the credit market. According to the index, countries with the rank between 0 and 6 are rare, and emerging countries (e.g. Brazil) have an index of 7, so we only include countries in our sample having a Fraser sub-index of 7 or higher. The use of a cutoff point of 7 ensures that countries with a non-market based financial system are dropped.
Following Von Hagen and Ho (2007) (2.1)) constructed using real interest rates and 24-months moving window for standard deviations NMPI Index (as in Equation (2.1)) constructed using nominal interest rates and 24-months moving window for standard deviations RMMPI Index (as in Equation (2.2)) constructed by using real interest rates and 24-months moving window for standard deviations NMMPI Index (as in Equation (2.2) For illustrative purposes, we first zoom in on the results for a subsample of 10 countries which includes three industrial economies (Japan, Korea, and the United States), and seven developing and emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, and Turkey). These 10 countries have experienced banking crises during the last three decades. Table 2 .2 presents descriptive statistics of the five indices for these countries.
The means and the standard deviations of RMPI and NMPI are much larger than those of RMMPI and NMMPI. The weights as used in Equation (2.2) are less than 1 while in Equation (2.1) they can be larger than 1, so that indices based on Equation according to the benchmark, it is labeled as a 'false alarms' (see Table 2 .3).
The frequency of 'missed crises' is defined as the number of crises listed in Laeven-Valencia that are not signaled by the index compared to the total number of crises listed in Laeven-Valencia, while the frequency of 'false alarms' is defined as the number of crises signaled by the index which are not listed in Laeven-Valencia compared to the total number of crises signaled by the index. 7 We follow von Hagen and Ho in comparing our index with a crises database constructed using the events method despite the shortcomings of this method as outlined in section 2.1. Von Hagen and Ho compare their crisis data and those of Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) for 15 countries and find that there is quite some similarity. We primarily use the Laeven and Valencia dataset for comparison purposes, as this the most recent database available. Chaudron and De Haan (2014) compare several banking crises datasets using the frequency of bank failures and the costs of banking crisis. These authors conclude that the Laeven and Valencia dataset is the most reliable source based on the event studies methodology. 8 In the sensitivity analysis we also employ a window of (T − 2, T + 2) where T is the crisis period according to Laeven-Valencia. 
Results

Comparison of five indices
We first compare the five indices. A first important conclusion is that money market pressure indexes, be it the original index of Von Hagen and Ho (2007) or our index, indicate many more banking crises than the databases based on the events methodology. Table 2 .4 zooms in on 'missed crises' and 'false alarms'. The indices based on nominal interest rates have fewer 'missed crises' than those based on real interest rates. Among the five indices, NMMPI has the lowest frequency of 'missed crises' and 'false alarms', so that we prefer this index to the others. 9 Moreover, VHH performs 'worse' than the other indices. (2010) do not identify this as a systemic crisis. Likewise, in many other cases there are severe economic problems, such as currency devaluations or economic downturns, which can all lead to periods with high stress in the banking system even though
Laeven-Valencia do not consider this stress as sufficient reason to consider the period as a banking crisis. Appendix Table A .3 provides further details of these cases.
In our view, most of the 'false alarms' indicate crises missed by Laeven-Valencia, crises not severe enough to be considered as systemic by Laeven-Valencia, or reflects stress in the banking sector.
Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection we compare the performance of RMMPI and NMMPI for different samples of countries, sample periods, window lengths, and benchmarks. We use RMMPI for comparison purposes, as it performs better than VHH and RMPI. 10 We first compare the performance of the two indices for different subsamples of countries. Table 2 .5 shows the results of identifying banking crises in industrial economies and developing economies. According to Laeven-Valencia, there were 11 and 57 banking crises in industrial economies and developing economies, respectively. In industrial economies, both RMMPI and NMMPI can signal 8 out of 11 banking crises, while the frequency of 'false alarms' of NMMPI is larger than that of RMMPI. Therefore, RMMPI performs better than NMMPI in industrial coun- 10 We have done the sensitivity analysis using all indices. The results show that RMMPI and NMMPI perform better than the other indices, so we do not show the results for the other indices.
tries. In developing economies, NMMPI signals crises more 'accurately' with fewer 'missed crises' and 'false alarms' than RMMPI. Table 2 .1 for their definition) for different samples of countries, and zooms in on 'missed crises' and 'false alarms' in identifying banking crises. 'Correct crises' is the number of crises identified in line with Laeven and Valencia (2010).
To investigate the performance of our indices over time, we divide our sample period into three sub-periods: 1970-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009 . Table 2 .1 for their definition) for different periods, and zooms in on 'missed crises' and 'false alarms' in identifying banking crises. 'Correct crises' is the number of crises identified in line with Laeven and Valencia (2010) ..
According to the results (available on request), NMMPI has the lowest frequency of 'missed crises' and 'false alarms' in all four cases.
As outlined in Section 2.4, we have followed Von Hagen and Ho's (2007) rule to determine whether a signal 'correctly' identifies a banking crisis, i.e. if the signal is in the window of (T − 2, T + 1) where T is the crisis period according to the benchmark it is considered as a correct signal. We have checked how sensitive our results are for this choice. It turns out that slightly enlarging the window to (T − 2, T + 2) gives very similar results. For illustrative purposes, Notes: This table shows the two types of errors for two indices. If there is a crisis at time T in the benchmark, the signal of NMMPI is correct if it falls in the period of (T − 2, T + 1). In the alternative this period is set at (T − 2, T + 2).
and 'false alarms', in line with our previous findings. Particularly, NMMPI with a time window of 24 months to calculate standard deviations signals banking crises more 'accurately' than the other indices. 12
Decision rule to identify crises
Our main conclusion from the results in the previous section is that NMMPI with a time window of 24 months to calculate standard deviations signals banking crises most 'accurately'. However this conclusion is based on the decision rule of Von Hagen and Ho (2007) to identify banking crises, i.e. a threshold equal to the 98.5%
percentile and a 5% growth rate of the MPI compared to the previous period.
In this section we try to find the optimal decision rule in identifying banking crises when using our preferred index, NMMPI. To this purpose, we will adopt the loss function given by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) 13 An alternative way to introduce the trade-off between 'missed crises' and 'false alarms' is the receiver operating characteristic as recently used in business cycle analysis (see Berge and Jorda, 2011) . 14 Changing the second condition of the decision rule, i.e. the index shows an increase compared to the previous period of at least 5%, has little impact on the empirical results. 
(2.4)
It follows that the larger c 2 is relative to c 1 , missed crises are considered more important than false alarms (and vice versa).
To estimate the values of the probabilities, we can use in-sample frequencies.
Specifically, we take p 0 to be equal to the frequency of banking crises occurring in the whole sample according to Laeven-Valencia, namely 0.099. The probabilities a(H) and b(H) depend on the value of the threshold H. 15 For example, if we set H = 98.5%, then a(0.985) is the associated probability of 'missed crises'. Similarly, b(0.985) is the probability of 'false alarms'.
In our analysis we let the value of H vary between 90% and 99% (with steps of 0.1%) to examine which value of the threshold gives the best performance of the indices. Without loss of generality, we set c 1 equal to 1 and let (c 2 − c 1 ) vary from 5 to 50 in steps of 5. 
Conclusions
The identification of banking crises is crucial for further research on banking crises.
Without a proper identification of crises, research on the determinants or consequences of crises will be rather futile. Different from the events methods, Von Hagen and Ho (2007) proposed an index of money market pressure to identify banking crises. In our view, the advantages of a monetary market pressure index include that it is less subjective, available at a higher frequency (several countries are not included in the most widely used crises databases) and timelier (as it relies on less information). We modify the Von Hagen-Ho index and apply it to a large set of countries, excluding countries with a repressed financial system. The main change is that in our modified index nominal interest rates are used instead of real interest rates as the former better capture money market stress, notably in developing countries. To avoid sample selection bias, our sample includes not only countries that suffered from one or more banking crises but also includes countries without banking crises. Our sample consists of 109 countries (21 industrial economies and 88 developing economies). We employ the database of banking crises of Laeven and Valencia (2010) for comparison purposes.
Our findings suggest that our preferred index outperforms the index of Von Hagen and Ho (2007) . The crises identified by our MMPI are more in line with the crises identified by Laeven and Valencia (2010), while the index also gives fewer 'false alarms'. This conclusion is robust when we use different groups of countries, different periods and different time windows.
We also find that money market pressure indexes, be it the original index of Von Hagen and Ho (2007) or our modified index, suggest many more banking crises than those included in the database of Laeven and Valencia (2010) . We argue that most of the 'false alarms' are crises missed by Laeven-Valencia, crises not severe enough to be considered as systemic by Laeven-Valencia, or reflects stress in the banking sector. Finally, we show that the 98.5% threshold used in the Von Hagen and Ho decision rule corresponds to a policy maker who dislikes 'false alarms' relative to 'missed crises'.
